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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
It is unlikely that the newly elected government of Dilma
Rousseff will make any fundamental changes to the major
imperatives that underlie Brazilian policy: that is,
macroeconomic stability and poverty alleviation. These
policy imperatives have set the country on the road to good
governance and have provided former presidents a chance to
claim continuity. While President Rousseff of the Workers’
Party (PT) may have a distinct style, personality, and set of
leadership skills compared to her predecessors, she is
expected to maintain the core macroeconomic stability and
social policies that are currently in place.
Many who expected Rousseff to be former president Luiz
Inácio “Lula” da Silva’s carbon copy are discovering that
from day one she has showcased a different governing style
than her mentor. She has emphasized her commanding
authority and has brought about fresh approaches to delicate
matters, which entail domestic economic issues and foreign
policy. For example, her administration has aggressively
applied a set of macro-prudential measures to counter
inflationary pressures on the Brazilian currency (Real). And
in foreign policy, she has steadfastly recalibrated Itamarity’s
stance on the controversial issues, such as Iran, and now
appears to have refocused its short-term efforts on cementing
Brazil’s leadership role in the region’s southern cone.
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Critics have long deemed Brazil as the eternal country of the
future. It now seems that the future has finally arrived.
Historically, Brazil’s boom and bust cycle, and its
ramifications of poverty and inequality, have been
inextricably linked to inflationary bubbles. Inflation is the
known and feared ghost that Brazilians have dealt with many
times in the past. In 1994, however, then Finance Minister,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso established the bases for
economic sustainability with the launching of the Plan Real.
The Plan entailed dropping the hyper-inflated Cruzeiro and
introducing the Real as the new currency. Officials took
calculated steps in implementing the Real; they first
temporarily introduced the URV, a transitional currency that
served as a catalyst to clamp down potential inflationary
pressures on the newly created Real.
With that caveat, Brazil’s government has been highly
constrained both institutionally and electorally to maintain
macroeconomic stability and keep inflation under control.
Keeping inflation in check not only shaped the next set of
elections, but also provided a shock to the Brazilian political
system. For example, because of the devastating impact of
hyperinflation, the president’s policies to control inflation
were viewed favorably by a great majority of the public,
which had become strongly averse to inflation.
Since the Brazilian electorate holds the president accountable
mostly for economic growth, inflation control, and the
1

In this session the author freely borrowed pieces from his recent short
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brookings.edu/experts/pereirac.aspx), where the author is a Visiting
Fellow. See, Carlos Pereira’s The Impact of Brazil’s Presidential
Elections: Different Roads, Similar Direction (September 28, 2010) and
Brazilian President Rousseff’s First Governing Coalition: Better, But not
Good Enough (February 8, 2011).
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unemployment rate, the 1994 election divided the country
between those that viewed inflation control as the top
political priority versus those that, at the time, did not
understand inflation control as key for electoral success and
for the wealth of the country. So it is that keeping
inflationary pressures in check reshaped the political
calculations and provided stability and predictability on
future electoral events.
At the same time that macroeconomic stability then became
a policy imperative in Brazilian politics, so too has social
policy. For example, providing economic and social mobility
opportunities to the poor through the implementation of
large-scale programs, such as bolsa família, noncontributory
pensions, and more access to credit is no longer a residual
policy in Brazil. At present day, social policies are as
important as macroeconomic stability and wield significant
weight in the elections. In fact, during the 2010 presidential
election, the campaign platform of the main opposition
candidate, José Serra, promised to double the number of
families assisted by bolsa família.2
Brazil has achieved significant social progress. According to
ActionAid, Brazil has been considered, for its second
consecutive year, as a leading country that “really fights
hunger” among developing countries as a whole. According
to the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal
(MDG) Monitor, Brazil has already achieved four of the
2

Bolsa Familia is the largest conditional cash transfer program in the
world. Launched in 2003, it provides income support to poor families,
subject to their fulfilling of certain human development requirements,
such as child school attendance including participation in supplementary
socio-educational activities, vaccinations, nutritional monitoring, prenatal
and post natal tests. Since its creation, coverage has expanded rapidly.
The number of beneficiaries tripled in four years rising from 3.6 million
in 2003 to 11.1 million in 2006 reaching around 75 per cent of the
estimated number of poor families. Read more:
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/jobcrisis/download/109B09_28_engl.pd
f.
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eight MDGs. These are: to eradicate extreme poverty and
hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote
gender equality and empower women, and combat
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. The other four
goals – reducing child mortality, improving maternal health,
ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a
global partnership for development – are considered very
likely to be achieved. Although the actual achievement of
some of these goals is questionable, it is important to keep in
mind that these are no trivial accomplishments in a society
where macroeconomic mismanagement and inequality were
for decades the most salient features.
Bolsa família proved very successful not only in combating
inequality but also in winning votes in President Lula’s
reelection in 2006, and in increasing votes for his successor
Dilma Rousseff four years later. The electoral base who
voted Lula into office in 2006, however, was not the same as
the one that voted for him in 2002. The PT’s traditional
electoral base was mostly formed by better educated and
high income voters in the relatively urban and industrial
sectors in Brazil’s south and southeast. However, Lula’s
social programs – especially the conditional cash transfer
scheme that targeted low-income families – were critical in
explaining his good electoral performance among lowincome voters. Hunter and Power (2007) show the impact of
targeted social policy on voter choice by correlating election
results with the implementation of the bolsa família program
at the sub-national level. They demonstrate that between 60
and 85 percent of votes from the impoverished north and
northeast of the country went to Lula. Bolsa família became
the centerpiece of social policy, and the number of Brazilian
families covered climbed rapidly to more than 12.7 million
families or about 50.8 million people – more than two thirds
of whom earned less than $33.00 a month. Moreover, the
program was implemented at the relatively low cost of 2.5
percent of all government expenditure (Hunter and Sugiyama
2009).
4

Between 2001 and 2007, Brazil experienced a sharp and
continuous decline in income inequality at an average rate of
1.2 percent per year. The per capita income of the poorest
groups grew fast and substantially in this period despite
modest economic growth of overall per capita income. This
decline in inequality and poverty, however, should not only
be interpreted as a result of poverty alleviation policies via
public transfers. Barros, et al. (2010) argues that changes in
labor income have played an equally important role. In
addition, they stress that the decline of inequality has to do
with the accelerated expansion of access to education during
the 1990s.
A FORWARD M ARCH
Poverty alleviation policies along with macroeconomic
stability policies have led to the emergence of a “new middle
class” in Brazil. According to Neri (2010), the Brazilian
middle class – families earning between R$1,064 and
R$4,561 per month – represented 42 percent of the
population in 2003. Today that share is 52 percent and is
expected to reach 55 percent in 2014. The Gini coefficient
that measures Brazil’s income inequality suggests that
millions have moved out of poverty and entered the middle
class every year since 2005.
This finding suggests that there will be more and more
domestic consumers in the Brazilian market, which in turn
will increase the potential to attract even more international
investors to a market that is already one of the most
attractive in the world – so much so that the Brazilian
government has taken steps to curtail foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Brazil to keep the economy from
overheating. This policy implementation process showcases
a welcomed maturity from the Brazilian government in its
attempt to rein in the FDI avalanche, but at the same time, it
paradoxically gives international investors one more reason
to invest in Brazil.
5

paradoxically gives international investors one more reason
to invest in Brazil.
Overall, Brazil has evolved in a manner that has not only
convinced top credit rating agencies to raise Brazilian debt to
“investment grade,” but also led Brazil to reach the status of
countries with high human development index. The
combination of macroeconomic stability policies and a
favorable international economic outlook created the
conditions for economic growth that allowed social
protection policies to be generated.
As a result, the Lula administration enjoyed massive popular
support and left the government with an astounding 87
percent approval rate. Therefore, Dilma Rousseff’s
government will not have the political and/or electoral
incentives to make comprehensive changes to Brazil’s two
main policy imperatives.
The incentive-structure of Brazil’s political institutions is too
ingrained and will continue to push Brazil in a similar
direction. While Rousseff might decide to increase the
government’s ability to cool off the economy by enhancing
the role of governmental agencies who subsidize the
domestic private sector with cheap loans – and as a result,
perhaps prevent Brazil from developing as quickly – she will
not be able to take the country backwards.
A FRAGMENTED
ENVIRONMENT

AND

SOMETIMES

POLARIZED

Brazil possesses a complex mix of electoral institutions that
allow for the representation of diverse interests within its
multiparty system. Often this is viewed as encouraging levels
of fragmentation and decentralization that can complicate the
policy-making process (Ames 2001). Yet, Brazil also
possesses some “majoritarian” institutions (provisional
6

decree, urgency petition, budgetary power) that centralize
power and encourage national-level governability. These two
sets of institutions represent poles of a continuum; they are
hybrids combining consensual and majoritarian elements at
the same time.
The current institutional and political balance is relatively
recent in Brazil. The Brazilian political system is a good
example of a historical struggle between those advocating
for consensual institutions (for example, characterized by
proportional representation, federalism, multiparty system,
and an independent judiciary) which prevailed during
democratic periods (especially from 1946 to 1964), and those
that promote strong centralism as seen during periods of
authoritarian rule (Getulio Vargas’ New State from 19371945, and the military dictatorship of 1964-1988). It took
two decades for the 1988 Constitution to institute an
environment capable of combining those apparently
antagonistic institutional features and for democracy to
become consolidated – which today, it is the only game in
town.3
Brazilian democracy has maintained several consensual
features such as presidentialism, proportional representation
(PR) with open list in the electoral system, a fragmented
party system, federalism, and an independent judiciary. In
the opposite direction, however, the legislature has delegated
the bulk of its powers to the executive, such as the power to
rule by decree, line item and total veto, emergency measures,
exclusive rights to legislate on budgetary and administrative
issues, and the power of unilaterally executing the budget
(Pereira and Mueller 2004). This paradoxical institutional
combination generated by the new Constitution made
3

According to Przeworski (1991), democracy is consolidated when
under given political and economic conditions a particular system of
institutions becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine
acting outside democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to
try again within the same institutions under which they have lost.
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democracy self-enforcing; that is, all the relevant political
forces have found it best to continue to submit their interests
and values to the uncertain interplay of the democratic
institutions.4
The underlying rationale for the new constitution was to
prevent institutional instability and deadlock/stalemate
between Congress and the Executive, which was extremely
prevalent in the previous period of democratic rule (from
1946 to 1964). In addition, the majority of legislators learned
from that period and from 22 years of dictatorship that an
institutionally weak president could not last without some
sort of governing capacity to enforce his/her agenda.
Legislators decided not to change the electoral rules – that is,
not to reform the PR open-list system in the new constitution
because it would create too much uncertainty with respect to
legislators’ electoral survival – but they also opted to transfer
institutional resources to the Executive to ensure
governability and stability of the democratic game.
The most important consequence of this new institutional
design was that democracy has no longer been under threat
in Brazil. With the exception of President Fernando Collor
de Mello (1990-1992), all elected presidents since 1988 have
been able to build reasonably stable post-electoral majority
coalitions within Congress and have experienced relatively
strong party discipline within the presidential governing
coalition, along with a high level of governability. Although
4

According to Melo (2009), the collective wisdom on Latin America was
that in countries where presidents enjoyed strong constitutional powers
and where multi-party coalitions prevailed, such countries would be
doomed to instability and institutional crises, while countries having
weak presidents and strong parties were expected to consolidate
democratic rule. After almost two decades this prediction failed. The key
to solving the paradox of strong presidents and robust democracies is that
democratic stability in Latin American countries has been engendered by
the existence of an extended system of checks and balances and rule of
law, which are ultimately generated by political competition and power
fragmentation.
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none of the elected presidents belonged to a party with a preelectoral absolute majority of the seats, they have,
nevertheless, been able to achieve congressional support by
use of their extensive legislative and non-legislative powers
as well as gains from exchange mechanisms under the
discretion of the executive (Pereira and Mueller 2004). In
fact, Brazil has not yet faced a truly divided government
under the current set of political institutions. This is not
coincidental given that institutional powers and resources are
held and selectively distributed by the Executive. The
combination of provisional decree, vetoes, urgency petitions,
budget dominance, and strategic allocation of resources
(pork and cabinets) provides the Executive with an
impressive set of instruments for imposing its legislative
priorities on Congress’ agenda.
The new Constitution of 1988 should, therefore, be viewed
as the critical junction that defined present political
institutions in Brazil and the powers of political actors. It
provided the institutional terrain for political cooperation to
take place. It also set the notion of strong executive power(s)
capable of driving the policymaking process. It is important
to keep in mind, however, that the institutional setting that
emerged from the 1988 Constitution was a consequence of
the legislature’s choice and not a result of any sort of
illegitimate usurpation of powers (as has been the case in
other Latin American countries). To some extent the 1988
Constitution could be understood as a function of a historical
learning process from previous unsettled institutional
experiences, especially from the preceding very
representative and fragmented democratic period (19461964) and the centralized military regime (1964-1985) that
followed. Both extreme institutional conditions in Brazil’s
past could also be characterized as illustrations of limited
access orders, where powerful individuals and groups
cooperated through access to particular State benefits and
privileges (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). During these
periods, some groups had more access to benefits than
9

others. This led to several often polarized and violent
conflicts among powerful elite groups fighting for a greater
chunk of rents-seeking benefits. With the new Constitution
of 1988, however, multiparty fragmentation was preserved,
but at the same time a powerful executive emerged with the
capacity to coordinate political parties in coalition under the
oversight of independent checks and balances institutions.
EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE
RELATIONS
ROUSSEFF’S COALITION GOVERNMENT

UNDER

As said before, presidential powers have generally allowed
the President to initiate, pursue and approve much of his/her
policy agenda. Whereas such a scenario may seem perilous
given Latin America’s history with strong presidents,
Brazilian political institutions provide safeguards against
abuse of powers. Although the separation of powers is
clearly biased towards the president, several other political
actors with different motivations (separation of purpose) are
able to check the president’s actions in different ways. Thus,
if an incompetent or ill-intentioned president were to come to
power, strong presidential powers would not mean a blank
check to pursue misguided policy. Therefore, Brazilian
presidents still need to build and sustain a majority coalition
in Congress in order to govern. Without a safe and faithful
majority coalition in Congress the presidents run the risk of
facing massive problems either to deal with controversial roll
calls in his/her agenda (a very good example was the recent
roll call about increasing the minimal wage) or when it needs
to block unwelcome opposition initiatives.
Brazil’s 2010 election was unique in that, in numeric terms,
the electoral coalition supporting Rousseff obtained the
majority of seats in both chambers of Congress – while in the
past, most coalition’s majority governing capacities have
been achieved after the elections, as explained prior.
Rousseff’s coalition will have nearly 64 percent of seats in
10

the Senate and 61 percent in the Chamber of Deputies (see
Table 1).
TABLE 1: POLITICAL PARTY SEAT ALLOCATION
IN THE BRAZILIAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
Rousseff’s Electoral
Coalition
Elect
Part Curre
ed
ntly
y
2010
PT

Opposition
Part
y
PSD
B
DE
M

Independent

Curre
ntly

Elect
ed
2010

Par
ty

Curre
ntly

Elect
ed
2010

59

53

PP

40

41

56

43

PV

14

15

03

02

79

88

90

79

41

41

PTB

22

21

PSB

27

34

PPS

15

12

PDT

23

28

03

04

PSC

16

17

03

03

12

15

01

03

01
02
297
(57.9
%)

08
01
311
(60.6
2%)

137
(26.7
%)

139
(27.0
9%)

PMD
B
PR/P
L

PCd
oB
PRB
PTC
TOT
AL

PM
N
PSO
L
PTd
oB

PH
S
PS
L
PR
P
PR
TB

01
02
02

57
(11.1
%)

63
(12.2
8%)

Source: Brazilian Electoral Tribunal – TSE.

Based on these favorable numbers it has been widely
speculated that Rousseff will face fewer difficulties with
Congress than Lula did. In addition to the number of seats,
however, other aspects discussed below are also fundamental
for understanding executive-legislative relations in
Rousseff’s multiparty presidential administration.
President Rousseff will have to make at least three
interconnected managerial choices that would have
11

important consequences for the quality, sustainability, costs,
and capacity of governing in Congress. These choices
include: the number of parties in the coalition, the
ideological heterogeneity of those parties, and the degree of
proportionality or power sharing among coalition partners.
In a co-authored forthcoming paper from Power and Raile
(2011), it is argued that each of these managerial choices
engenders trade-offs and different costs for the executive.
Coalitions that are larger, have greater ideological
heterogeneity, or have a higher concentration of power in
one of its members, are more difficult to manage. The less
proportional the cabinet, the less satisfied the coalition
partners in the legislature, and the higher the cost of
sustaining
their
loyalty.
A
cabinet
constituted
disproportionately of an executive’s own partisans may also
create external animosity, but the larger effect would be to
disrupt relationships within the governing coalition. Such
situations imply a higher cost of governing, more
coordination problems, and a greater necessity of side
payments (pork barrel, patronage, policy concessions, etc.) to
discipline the coalition. Ignoring such expectations can
undermine support from within the governing coalition.
A comparison of how the former three Brazilian presidents
managed their respective coalitions in Congress might be
illustrative for understanding the impact of those choices on
executive-legislative relations in the future government of
Dilma Rousseff (see Table 2 in the Appendix).
President Collor had an initial governing coalition that
consisted of only three political parties. Collor’s coalition
began with 245 seats, which was about 49 percent; this was
clearly a minority coalition government. His cabinet was
relatively homogeneous, featuring mostly right-wing parties.
His cabinets, however, were extremely disproportional. In
his first cabinet, 60 percent of the posts went to nonpartisan
ministers. He did not share power with parties that could
12

support him in times of need. In 1992, facing massive
popular protests and without a credible and sustainable
coalition in Congress, the cost of “buying” support
eventually caught up with Collor. He was impeached and
removed from office.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), on the other hand,
learned quickly that governing without a sustainable
coalition in Congress would be too risky. He initially
decided to include only four parties in his governing
coalition (Social Democratic Party-PSDB, Liberal PartyPFL, Labor Party-PTB, and the Democratic Party-PMDB).
Nevertheless, within two years he realized that he would
need a broader majority to gain approval of his numerous
constitutional reform proposals, which would require
majority support in both houses. Cardoso recruited two
additional parties (the PPB and PPS) into his government,
bringing the coalition size up to almost 75 percent of seats in
Congress. Although large in size, the Cardoso coalition was
not endangered by internal ideological differences. The
coalition was center-right and shared the president’s views
on constitutional reforms. The outstanding feature of the
Cardoso coalition was the cabinet’s high level of
“coalescence” (Amorim Neto 2002). Cardoso’s coalition
management was decisive in helping him to sustain his
majority coalition for almost eight years at a comparatively
low cost.
Lula adopted a different coalition management approach. He
formed an eight party coalition and increased the number of
cabinet-level posts from 21 to 35 to accommodate the
president’s own Workers’ Party-PT loyalties, which was
awarded no fewer than 20 portfolios. In December 2003, the
PMDB was added to the coalition as the ninth party in the
cabinet but received only two cabinet positions. The PT did
not “make room” for the PMDB. This skewed allocation
increased the PT’s dominance over its governing coalition
partners. This sharp reduction in proportionality occurred
13

exactly at the same time the mensalão is alleged to have
begun5. The PT controlled 60 percent of the cabinet
portfolios while supplying only 29 percent of the coalition’s
seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In his second term in
office, Lula seems to have learned from the mensalão
scandal by adjusting his governing coalition and allocating
more cabinets to other coalition members; but the PT
continued to monopolize his cabinet. The ideological
spectrum of Lula’s coalition was much more diverse than
that of Cardoso’s, spanning from extreme left wing to
extreme right wing parties.
How about the coalition profile of Dilma Rousseff’s
government? Like Lula, Rousseff built a very heterogeneous,
over-sized, and over-concentrated governing coalition,
preferring to satisfy the internal factions within the PT. As
expected, Rousseff decided to invite a large number of
partners into her coalition cabinet, but the number was
slightly smaller than that of Lula’s. Whereas Lula had eight
political parties in his first cabinet, Rousseff invited seven.
The number of parties did in fact translate into a larger
majority within Congress since the nominal size of
Rousseff’s coalition enjoys 328 seats in Brazil’s Chamber of
Deputies, which is above the 60 percent supermajority of
308 votes needed for constitutional amendments. Therefore,
if she faces problems pursuing her political agenda, it would
not be credible for her to blame the political opposition.
Recently Rousseff proved her control over her coalition and
rammed through in a total partisan manner the approval of
the minimum wage law with the initial proposed amount of
545 Reais. She pulled this show of force even though she
5

The "mensalao" relates to payments alleged to have been made each
month in 2003 and 2004 to opposition politicians by President Lula's
Workers Party (PT), which had a minority in Congress and governed
through a coalition of several parties. The payments, said to be around
$13,000 (£6,500) a month to lawmakers, were allegedly used to buy their
support so they would vote in line with the PT. Read more:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4676435.stm.
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faced mounting pressure from the unions who historically
have backed the PT; nevertheless Rousseff along with Lula’s
vocal support reigned in her coalition and commanded
through the legislature her initial proposal without any
negotiations.
The ideological spectrum of Rousseff’s coalition is very
similar to that of Lula’s, spanning from extreme leftwing to
extreme rightwing parties. Although Rousseff will certainly
try to maintain the core macroeconomic stability and social
policies currently in place, we should not view coalition
problems as a function of the ideological diversity of her
governing coalition. That is, as the policy agenda will be
very similar to her predecessor’s agenda, Rousseff will
probably not face too much opposition from coalition
members as a function of their different ideological
preferences.
Concerning power sharing, Rousseff’s first cabinet is less
monopolistic than Lula’s given that she allocated 17 (around
46 percent) cabinet positions to PT while Lula allocated 21
posts (60 percent). The coalition formatter again received a
substantial cabinet bonus. The Brazilian Democratic Party
(PMDB) has also been over-allocated with positions with 6
portfolios (37 percent). This clearly illustrates Rousseff’s
intent to please the second largest party in Brazil’s Chamber
of Deputies, the largest party in the Senate, as well as the
party of Rousseff’s vice-president.
Table 3 compares cabinet disparity or the difference between
the intra-coalitional percentages of cabinet posts held by the
party and the intra-coalitional percentage of lower legislative
house seats held by the party. The only parties with positive
cabinet disparities within Rousseff’s coalition are PT and
PMDB, with 18.95 and 12.93, respectively. Hence, these two
parties received a disproportionately high percentage of
cabinet posts, which do not reflect their proportional weight
15

in Congress, 88 seats (26.99 percent) and 79 seats (24.23
percent), respectively.
TABLE 3: C ABINET DISPARITY AMONG BRAZILIAN
GOVERNMENT
(COLLOR, CARDOSO, LULA, AND ROUSSEFF)
Party
PSDB
PFL
PMDB
PP
PPS
PTB
PT
PDT
PCdoB
PL/PR
PSB
PV
PRN

Collor
-17.14
-43.06

Cardoso
2.59
-8.51
-12.26
-6.23
3.97
-3.38

Lula

Dilma

-18.82

12.93
-9.87

-3.43
-13.18
31.38
2.88
-10.66
-3.43
0.97

0.2

18.95
-5.88
-1.9
-9.87
-5.02

Note: “Cabinet Disparity” is the difference between the intra-coalitional
percentage of cabinet posts held by the party and the intra-coalitional
percentage of lower legislative house seats held by the party. Negative
values indicate that a party has received a disproportionately low
percentage of cabinet posts, while positive values indicate a
disproportionately high percentage of cabinet posts. Chart appears in
Carlos Pereira’s Brazil’s President Rousseff’s First Governing
Coalition…op. cit.

However, other important parties participating in Rousseff’s
coalition received cabinet seats that were worse than their
share of lower-chamber legislative seats. These parties were
severely under-rewarded, particularly the Popular Party-PP,
Liberal Party-PL/PR, Democratic Labor Party-PDT and
Brazilian Socialist Party-PSB, which received a
disproportionately low percentage of cabinet posts (-9.87, 9.87, -5.88, and -5.02, respectively). As these parties had
16

their initial expectations dashed by receiving a
disproportionately low number of cabinet seats, we should
observe that they will receive other forms of compensation,
such as a higher distribution of monetary benefits in the form
of pork barrel politics and/or patronage in lower ranks of the
public administration, in order to keep them in line with the
government. Otherwise, growing dissatisfaction would lead
to more frequent coalition defections and consequently
higher difficulties of sustaining and coordinating political
support in Brazil’s Congress. In other words, in addition to
numerically aggrandizing coalitions, the way presidents
manage their coalitions also matters for presidential success
in Congress.
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. RELATIONS
The first official international trip of President Dilma
Rousseff was to Argentina on January 31, 2011. This visit
was a clear sign of her intention to follow Lula’s main
foreign policy goals of prioritizing regional integration
within Latin America – to consolidate Brazil’s status as a
regional power – and furthering leadership among
developing countries within the “global south.”
Brazil has played an important role in establishing new
multilateral organizations like Mercosur, although in this
particular case it has had much more success in developing
political cohesion than true economic integration. Under the
Lula administration, Brazil stepped up to play a more active
role in maintaining regional peace and stability; however, its
growing commercial and political influence has received
some pushback from neighboring countries who fear a
hegemonic power is in the makings.
Historically, Brazil has looked inwards and was somewhat
disconnected from its neighbors. In recent years, however,
Brazilian diplomacy has broken with the Baron of Rio
17

Branco – considered the father of Brazilian diplomacy –
inward-looking strategic diplomacy and has actively pursued
a strategic plan to assert Brazilian interests in the region. In
doing so, Brazil is going through a learning curve when
dealing in conflictive situations as the major power.
Bolivia’s President Evo Morales’ nationalization of the
Brazilian state-owned oil company Petrobras’ natural gas
activities was the first test of the new boundaries Brazilian
diplomacy will have to deal with.
The creation of regional multilateral organizations like
UNASUR and the already established Mercosur have aided
Brazil in dealing with such situations and allowed President
Lula to exert presidentialism-based diplomacy with its
counterparts. Rousseff will most likely also take advantage
of the extra perks these gateways offer; however it remains
to be seen how her personality will interact with other
regional players.
Lula recognized this advantage in addition to the
commercial opportunities multilateral organizations offered.
He called for an enlarged Mercosur to better defend the
region’s interests. This request falls in line with the idea that
the bloc, from its inception, was designed to become the
main axis of integration in South and even Latin America.
There are, however, several caveats to this strategy that
suggest that Lula’s call is somewhat of an elusive political
statement. First, despite the fact that full membership is
permitted to any Latin American country that requests
admission, no country has ever requested it, aside from
Venezuela, who has been waiting for over two years for its
full admission, and at the present time, this outcome seems
very unlikely.
One of the reasons Mercosur has unconvincing credentials as
an open regionalism mechanism is its admission process and
what full admission entails. In order to gain full membership,
countries would have to forgo their own trade policies and
18

agreements to abide by the bloc’s more protectionist rules (or
Mercosur would have to lower its own trade tariffs).
Countries that have signed Free Trade Agreements with the
U.S., European Union (E.U.) or China, for example, would
not be eligible for full membership under current Mercosur
trade rules. This would apply to Chile, Colombia, Peru,
Mexico, and the Central American countries.
Second, even if new members were to join, rather than
increase the bloc’s bargaining power they would most likely
enhance internal contradictions that stand in the way of
negotiations. Since Mercosur’s decision-making process is
by consensus, the inclusion of new members would increase
the number of veto players. To avoid this risk, the bloc
would have to adopt an E.U.-style of decision-making (i.e.,
majority voting), and/or directly deal with the economic
asymmetries and trade disputes that exist today between
member countries. As Mercosur seeks horizontal expansion,
it will be pushed to address shortcomings of its vertical
institutionalization.
Although some important disagreements have emerged lately
between the U.S. and Brazil (especially with regard to
different policy approaches toward situations in Honduras,
Iran, and trade issues) relations between the two countries
have generally been constructive and positive in a wide
range of issues, including: counter-narcotics, trade, human
rights, energy, environment, promoting bio-fuels, intellectual
property rights, and providing security in Haiti.
Nevertheless, Brazil has been one of the key opponents to a
Free Trade Area of the Americas, and it has ongoing disputes
over U.S. tariffs on Brazilian ethanol, and the Doha Round
of WTO negotiations over U.S subsidies for cotton farmers.
Brazil had also developed concerns about the initial
agreement between the U.S. and Colombia to provide the
U.S. access to seven Colombian military bases. Yet Brazil
too under Lula signed defense agreements with the U.S.
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Most recently, Brazil and the U.S. have also clashed over
policy toward Iran. Whereas Brazilians perceived the Iranian
Nuclear Exchange Agreement brokered by then foreign
minister Celso Amorim in partnership with Turkey as a kind
of confidence building step to bring Iran back to
negotiations, the U.S. understood the agreement as a
delaying tactic and decided to go ahead approving extra
sanctions in the U.N. Security Council. However, having
differences is natural between countries with diverse
interests, in which foreign policy on both sides is inevitably
affected by conflicting domestic political determinants and
economic disputes. It is important to point out that despite
current and historical differences, Brazilian and U.S.
interests are not identical, but they are potentially
compatible.
It is still too soon to predict how Brazil and U.S. relations
will evolve under Dilma Rousseff’s administration.
However, the Rousseff government has made considerable
changes that may yield improved relations. Under her
tutelage, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) has
changed reigns. The new Minister of Foreign Relations is
none other than the former Brazilian Ambassador to the
U.S., Antonio Patriota, who has significantly softened
Brazil’s rhetoric on the Iranian issue. As a consequence,
Brazil no longer demands to participate in the negotiations.
In addition, Itamaraty has ordered its embassies and UN
mission to prepare a review assessing the state of Brazilian
foreign policy. The
report
will address human
rights in countries with authoritarian regimes and also focus
on Brazil's relationship with the United States. Rousseff
herself has repeatedly asserted her administration’s
commitment to human rights anywhere in the world, a move
that is seen as a clear distancing effort from Iran.
This could be seen as a sign that new avenues of cooperation
and fewer tensions may evolve with the U.S. President
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Obama recently announced in January 2010 that he will visit
Brazil. This could be an opportunity to reopen the
discussions at the highest level, which could focus on several
of the controversial issues mentioned above.
It’s clear that Brazil sees a national interest in the creation of
a world order more hospitable to a pluralism of interests, and
the Rousseff government will follow this caveat. However
the manner in which it will do so seems to entail a gentler
diplomatic approach to that of the Lula administration. For
the U.S.’s part, it sees managing its relationship with the new
Brazilian administration as an increasing priority for US
foreign policy. This convergence of interests will also have
to deal with essential challenges for US-Brazil relations,
which at this stage would be to first build greater synergy on
major global issues, which are diverse and reflect complex
interests from both countries.
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